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Abstract
A variant of the Mobile Ambient calculus, called Boundary Ambients, is introduced, supporting the modelling of multi-
level security policies. Ambients that may guarantee to properly protect their content are explicitly identiﬁed as boundaries:
a boundary can be seen as a resource access manager for conﬁdential data. In this setting, absence of direct information
leakage is granted as soon as the initial process satisﬁes some syntactic conditions. We then give a new notion of non-inter-
ference for Boundary Ambients aiming at capturing indirect ﬂows, too. We design a control ﬂow analysis that computes
an over-approximation of all ambients that may be affected at run-time by high-level data and we show that this static
analysis can be used to enforce non-interference, i.e., to statically detect that no (direct or indirect) information leakage is
ever possible at run-time.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The Mobile Ambient calculus [12] is a very interesting workbench to reason about mobility related issues,
in which security plays a crucial role. Our starting point is the “core” version of Mobile Ambients, where no
communication primitives are present and the only possible actions are represented by the moves performed by
mobile processes.We choose this basic calculus because it allows us to study a very general notion of information
ﬂow security which should be easily scalable also to more reﬁned versions of the calculus such as, e.g., Boxed
Ambients [10], Safe Ambients [26], or BioAmbients [32].
Among the security models, the Bell-LaPadula model (BLP) [2] provides a framework for handling data
of different clearance levels (high and low, for simplicity), and for this reason is also called multi-level security
model. The purpose of the model is to conﬁne sensitive data at its correct level by means of two access rules
that are imposed by the system: No Read up prevents users from accessing information for which they are not
cleared to access; No Write down prevents users (or more importantly software) from taking more sensitive
information and writing it into a less sensitive document. In this way, the BLP model guarantees that data from
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a high security level can never ﬂow downwards to a lower security level. However, these two access control rules
are not sufﬁcient to guarantee absence of information leakage, as they do not prevent conﬁdential information
to be indirectly transmitted through system side effects. For example, a user with a low clearance may request
to create a ﬁle of a given name. Suppose that a highly classiﬁed ﬁle of the same name already exists, then the
system might reply “request denied” or, arguably worse, “request denied, a ﬁle with this name already exists”.
This represents a so-called covert channel that could potentially be exploited to signal high-level information
to a low process. The BLP model does not prevent indirect information leakage due to the presence of shared
resources. It is then necessary to integrate this discipline with a covert channel analysis, considering the whole
ﬂow of information.
In [5], we investigated how to express the BLP model in the Mobile Ambients framework. To this aim, we
introduced the notion of security boundary, that allows us to identify ambients that may guarantee to properly
protect their content. The intuition is the following: a boundary separates the untrusted environment from the
trusted entities and data. Depending on the context, a boundary may represent different security mechanisms.
For example, it may model cryptography, which protects data sent on public networks, or it may represent
a protected part of a ﬁle-system where conﬁdential data are stored in order to enforce some access control
policy. Once the concept of security boundary is introduced, it becomes easy to deﬁne what absence of (direct)
information leakage means: at run-time, every high-level data or process should be always encapsulated into
a boundary. Thus, a direct ﬂow is deﬁned as a boundary crossing and may be statically detected by a suitable
nesting analysis.
As a ﬁrst example of direct information ﬂow, consider the following process, that models how a bank may
communicate a credit card number:
bank_db[[ cc_number [ out bank_db.Q] |P ]] .
The [ ] notation denotes an ambient, while [[ ]] is used to denote security boundaries. The out capability,
when it applies, moves the enclosing ambient out of the target ambient bank_db, reaching a state of the system
where the credit card number is exposed to the possibly untrusted environment:
bank_db[[P ]] | cc_number [Q] .
Notice that the ﬂow illustrated above might happen after many interactions with the bank database have been
performed. As a consequence, it could be non-trivial to discover the ﬂaw by checking all possible executions,
thus the importance of an automatic method for the detection of these kinds of ﬂows.
In this paper, we go one step further, facing the issue of detecting also indirect information leakage. Consider
the following example:
bank_db[[ cc_number [P ] | open cc_number . signal [ out bank_db.S] | Q]] .
As the credit card number is not moving out of the database, in this case no direct information leakage ever
arises. Instead, the presence of the credit card number in the database may be tested through an open capability
which can be activated only if the target ambient is present as sibling and, only after that, a low-level signal is
sent out of the database. The reached state is:
bank_db[[P | Q]] | signal [S ] .
Since signal is low-level, this does not constitute a direct information leakage. However, we know that ambient
signal exits the database only if the credit card number cc_number is present, i.e., the presence of signal at the
environment level is caused by a conﬁdential datum in the database. For this reason, process open cc_number .
signal [ out bank_db.S] can be seen as a Trojan Horse program that has been erroneously downloaded and run
inside the bank database, which indirectly leaks high-level information.
In order to face both direct and indirect information ﬂows, we proceed as follows. First, we extend the lan-
guage by including boundaries in the semantics. The advantage of this choice is that it allows to enforce a simple
access control policy that guarantees the absence of direct information ﬂow, still leaving open the much more
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intriguing issue of facing indirect information ﬂow. Informally, there is no conﬁdential data leakage (both direct
and indirect) if the system behaviour is not inﬂuenced by high-level values/processes, i.e, if the high-level part of
the system is not able to “interfere” with the low-level one [22]. We formalise this idea as in [1] by requiring that
an interference-free process is equal to the same process in which the names of high-level ambients have been
modiﬁed.
For instance, assume that the high-level value cc_number of the example above, is changed into
cc_number′1 :
bank_db[[ cc_number ′ [Q ] | open cc_number . signal [ out bank_db.S] | P ]] .
Since the open capability cannot be performed anymore, the signal ambient cannot move out the database. This
difference is observable by a low-level observer, and it makes the initial process not equivalent to the perturbed
one. This is due to the fact that there exists a causality between the actual high-level values and the behaviour
of signal. This casual inﬂuence gives rise to an implicit information ﬂow.
In order to automatically verify if a process is interference-free, we extend the control ﬂow analysis of [5] in
two directions:
(i) the presence of boundary names in the language allows us to improve the accuracy of the analysis, as
constraints on boundary crossings reduce the occurrences of possible nestings and prevent direct leakage
to happen;
(ii) a set of suspect ambients is computed, which contains all high-level ambients and is closed under the
following condition: every ambient that may exercise a capability on a suspect ambient is suspect too.
Informally, this set of suspect ambients is an over-approximation of ambients whose behaviour could be inﬂu-
enced by high-level ambients.We prove that if the set of suspect ambients is protected inside security boundaries,
then the observable behaviour of the system does not change, i.e., there is no indirect leakage.
The main contributions of our paper can be summarized as follows:
• Boundary Ambients: we extend Mobile Ambients by including in the semantics the notion of boundaries.
This provides a simple translation of the BLP access control model into a core model of mobility. As men-
tioned above, the concept of boundary has been ﬁrst introduced in [5] to model BLP rules and capture direct
information leakage. However, in that work, boundaries had no semantic import and were only used to check
BLP violations and not to enforce the BLP access control rules, as done in the new calculus presented here;
• non-interference: we formalize non-interference in the Boundary Ambient setting. As discussed above, this
is done similarly to [1]. We will see, however, that our setting requires some technical subtleties in order to
restrict the set of observational contexts to the “well-behaving”ones, i.e., the ones that donot leak information.
This non-interference notion is orthogonal to the idea of boundaries and should scale, with no substantial
modiﬁcations, to different settings, e.g., to other variants of Mobile Ambients;
• control ﬂow analysis for non-interference: we extend the control ﬂow analysis of [5] in order to track potential
causal relations among high and low level ambients. This is done through the notion of suspect ambients
introduced above. The analysis of [5] is an extension of [28] in which we separate the set of nestings occurring
inside or outside a boundary, achieving amore accurate over-approximation of the actual process behaviour.
The extension presented here would also work on the basic nesting analysis of [28], but with strictly less
precision, as we will show in Section 4.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no results in the literature concerning indirect information leakage
detection in the communication-free fragment Mobile Ambients [3]. The only related work we are aware of,
follows a different approach aiming at deﬁning a type system that guarantees non-interference in Boxed Amb-
ients [13]. Moreover, the control ﬂow analysis approach allows us to infer an over-approximation of ambient
nestings and suspect ambients. Thus, it leads to positive information also when process P is not recognised
1 We are assuming that the Trojan Horse open cc_number. signal [ out bank_db.S] is not part of the initial process, this is why it is not
affected by the substitution.
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as interference-free, as it may dramatically reduce the size of code inspection either to ﬁnd possible causes of
information leakage, or to recognise it as a false positive. This is valuable when compared with the veriﬁcation
approach by prescriptive rules like in type-system approaches.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the Boundary Ambient calculus
and we formalise multi-level security in this setting. In Section 3, we deﬁne the notions of direct and indirect
information leakage, whereas in Section 4, we introduce a control ﬂow analysis to statically verify absence of
indirect information leakage in the Boundary Ambients framework. Section 5 concludes the paper with ﬁnal
remarks and comparisons with related works.
2. The Boundary Ambient calculus
The Mobile Ambient calculus was introduced in [12] with the main purpose of explicitly modelling mobility.
The notion of ambient captures simply and powerfully the structure and properties of wide-area networks,
mobile computing, and mobile computation. Ambients are arbitrarily nested boxes which can move around
through suitable capabilities. Boundary Ambients (B-Ambients, for short) extend Mobile Ambients with special
ambients, called boundaries, that are responsible of conﬁning conﬁdential information, thus enforcing an access
control mechanism.
In this section, we introduce the syntax and the semantics of the B-Ambient calculus. Then, we introduce
the Morris-style contextual equivalence [27] for the ambient calculus as a way of equating process behaviours.
Finally, by exploiting the notion of boundary and a simple labelling of the core syntax primitives, we describe
how to formalise the Bell-LaPadula model [22] in the setting of Mobile Ambients.
2.1. Syntax and operational semantics
The syntax of processes is the same of Mobile Ambients, except for the set of ambient names Names, which
is partitioned into two disjoint sets, Amb and Bound: Amb represents the set of all ambient names and Bound
represents the set of all boundary names. The syntax is given in Fig. 1, where n ∈ Names, i.e., n is either an
ambient or a boundary.
Intuitively, the restriction (n)P introduces the new (and unique) name n and limits its scope to P ; process
0 is the null process (no action)2 ; P | Q indicates P and Q running in parallel; replication is a technically
convenient way of representing recursion and iteration as !P denotes any number of copies of P in parallel.
An ambient/boundary is written n[P ] with n the name of the ambient/boundary, and P the process running
inside. In the following, when writing n[P ] we implicitly assume that n is an ambient, i.e., n ∈ Amb, whereas
the notation n[[P ]] will be used to denote the fact that n is a boundary, i.e., n ∈ Bound. The capabilities in n
and out mmove their enclosing ambients/boundaries in and out n, respectively; the capability open n is used
to dissolve a sibling ambient/boundary n. The novelty of the calculus is the fact that moves over boundaries
are controlled: out mand open n , when n is a boundary, are allowed only when the executing ambient is itself a
boundary. These requirements are enforced by side-conditions on the reduction rules for the open and the out
capabilities, as reported in Fig. 2. The only name binding operator is : names that are not bound by a  operator
are thus free names. We denote by fn(P) the set of free names of process P, and by bn(P) the set of bound names.
The operational semantics of a process P is given through a reduction relation→ and a structural congruence
≡ between processes. They are depicted in Figs. 2 and 3, respectively. Reduction is deﬁned by a family of infer-
ence rules. Intuitively, P → Q represents the possibility for P of reducing to Q through some computation. We
will write P →∗ Q to denote, as usual, the reﬂexive and transitive closure of P → Q. The structural congruence,
as for Mobile Ambients, rearranges the syntax of a Boundary Ambient process in order to bring potential inter-
actors together. In addition, we identify processes up to renaming of bound names: (n)P = (m)P {n ← m} if
m ∈ fn(P). This means that these processes are understood to be identical, as opposite to structurally equivalent.
2 For the sake of readability, we will sometimes omit the terminating 0 at the end of every process speciﬁcation, e.g., we will write
in n | n[ ] in place of in n.0 | n[ 0 ] .
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Example 2.1. Let P1 be a process modelling a query sent from a client to a database:
P1 = client [ query[ out client .in database .Q] ]
|
database[ open query .R] .
Initially, query is inside client. Then, it exits the client and enters the database by applying its capabilities
out client and in database , respectively. Thus, process P1 moves to:
client [ 0 ] | database [ query[Q] | open query .R] .
Once the database has received the query, it reads its content by consuming its open query capability. At this
point, P1 reaches the state client [ 0 ] | database [Q | R] . The query is then processed by the interaction of Q
and R. Observe that in the example there is no restriction over the moves because none of the actors in P1 is a
boundary.
Example 2.2. We can now exploit boundaries in order to model a simple access control mechanism. In some
situations, critical operations need to be executed in a secure and protected environment. For example, let P2 be
a process modelling a safe inside a bank caveau caveau1, i.e.,
P2 = caveau1[[ safe[[ out caveau1 .in caveau2 | Q]] ]]
|
open safe
|
caveau2[[ open safe ]] .
Notice that, in this case, caveau1, caveau2 and safe are boundaries, thus, according to the semantics of B-Ambi-
ents, the open safe capability can be performed only when safe is inside one of the caveaux, which prevents safe
to be opened by any ambient at the environment level. Thus, P2 moves to
P2 = caveau1[[ 0 ]]
|
open safe | safe[[ in caveau2 | Q]]
|
caveau2[[ open safe ]] ,
but the open capability cannot be performed on the boundary safe at the environment level. For this reason, the
only possible reduction leads the system to:
P2 = caveau1[[ 0 ]]
|
open safe
|
caveau2[[ open safe | safe[[Q]] ]]
where safe can ﬁnally be opened.
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Fig. 1. Syntax of Boundary Ambients.
Fig. 2. Reduction Rules: P → Q.
Fig. 3. Structural Congruence: P ≡ Q.
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2.2. Observational equivalences
We now recall some deﬁnitions in [23] about contexts and observables that will be useful in the following
sections. In fact, the notion of information leakage we will introduce in Section 3.2 is based on a form of Mor-
ris-style contextual equivalence [27] (otherwise known as may-testing equivalence) for the ambient calculus. Two
processes are contextually equivalent if and only if they admit the same observations whenever they are inserted
inside any arbitrary context. In the setting of the ambient calculus, contextual equivalence is deﬁned in terms of
observing the presence, at the top-level of a process, of an ambient/boundary whose name is not restricted.
Deﬁnition 2.3 (Context: C). A context C is a process containing zero or more holes. In the following, we write
C(P) for the outcome of ﬁlling each hole in the context C with process P .
Example 2.4.Let P3 be a process of the form P3 = s[Q] | b[[R]] , andC a context of the formC(_)= t [S ] | d [[ _ ]] .
Then, C(P3) = t [S ] | d [[ s[Q] | b[[R]] ]] . Notice that names which are free in P3 may become bound in C(P3).
Hence, we do not identify contexts up to renaming of bound names.
The following deﬁnitions formally introduce the notion of what may be observable in a B-Ambient pro-
cess, i.e., ambient/boundary names not restricted at the top-level. This notion is then exploited to deﬁne two
well-known process equivalences, namely contextual equivalence and barbed congruence.
Deﬁnition 2.5 (Exhibition of a name: P ↓ n). Let P be a process, and n ∈ Names the name of either a boundary
or an ambient. Then, P exhibits name n (P ↓ n) iff there are m1,m2, . . .,mk with mi /= n ∀i ≤ k , and two processes
P ′ and P ′′ such that P ≡ (m1,m2, . . .,mk)( n[P ′ ] | P ′′).
Furthermore, a process P is said to converge to a name n ∈ Names (written P ⇓ n) if P exhibits n after some
parameterised reductions, i.e., if P →∗ Q and Q ↓ n.
The following deﬁnition is a parameterised version of the contextual equivalence described in [23] which
considers only a subset  of all possible contexts.
Deﬁnition 2.6 (Contextual equivalence up to : P  P ′). Let  be a set of contexts. Two processes P and P ′ are
contextually equivalent up to , denoted (P  P ′), iff for all n ∈ Names and C ∈ , C(P) ⇓ n ⇔ C(P ′) ⇓ n.
Example 2.7. To show that two processes are contextually inequivalent, it sufﬁces to ﬁnd a context that dis-
tinguishes them. For example, let C(_) = m[ _ ] be a context in . If m /= n, then C( p [ out m.0 ] ) ⇓ p , but
C( p [ out n .0 ] ) ⇓ p . Thus, p [ out m.0 ]  p [ out n .0 ] .
In general, it is hard to prove that two processes are contextually equivalent, since onemust consider their behav-
iour when placed in an arbitrary context. In the technical proofs we will use the following deﬁnition of barbed
bisimilarity and barbed congruence, since barbed congruence is a sufﬁcient condition for proving contextual
equivalence as shown in Proposition 2.10.
Deﬁnition 2.8 (Barbed bisimilarity: P ≈ P ′). A barbed bisimulation is a symmetric relation S such that whenever
(P , P ′) ∈ S ,
• P ↓ n implies P ′ ↓ n;
• P −→ Q implies that ∃Q′ such that P ′ −→∗ Q′ and (Q,Q′) ∈ S .
Barbed bisimilarity is the union of all barbed bisimulations. In other words, two processes P and P ′ are barbed
bisimilar (P ≈ P ′) iff there exists a barbed bisimulation S such that (P , P ′) ∈ S .
Deﬁnition 2.9 (Barbed congruence up to  : P ≈ P ′). Let  be a set of contexts. Two processes P and P ′ are
barbed congruent up to , denoted (P ≈ P ′), iff for all C ∈ , C(P) ≈ C(P ′).
The following result shows that, as expected, barbed congruence is stronger than contextual equivalence, i.e.,
≈ is a sound proof-technique for contextual equivalence.
Proposition 2.10. Let  be a set of contexts. P ≈ P ′ implies P  P ′.
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Fig. 4. Information ﬂows in the BLP model [17].
Proof. Assume P ≈ P ′ and consider a context C ∈  and a name n ∈ Names. We prove that C(P) ⇓ n implies
C(P ′) ⇓ n. C(P) ⇓ nmeans that ∃Q s.t. C(P) →∗ Q ∧ Q ↓ n. Since P ≈ P ′ and C ∈  we also have C(P) ≈ C(P ′).
By deﬁnition of barbed bisimilarity, ∃Q′ such that C(P ′) →∗ Q′, with Q ≈ Q′, thus Q ↓ n implies Q′ ↓ n, hence
proving that C(P ′) ⇓ n.
The fact that C(P ′) ⇓ n implies C(P) ⇓ n may be symmetrically proved. We thus have that for all C ∈  and
for all names n ∈ Names, C(P) ⇓ n iff C(P ′) ⇓ n, and so the thesis P  P ′. 
2.3. Modelling multi-level security
Let us now formalise the Bell-LaPadula model in the setting of Mobile and Boundary Ambients. Fig. 4
summarises all the ﬂows allowed by the BLP model, including covert channels. Security levels are arranged
into a lattice 〈L,≤〉, where 1 ≤ 2 means that 1 has a security level lower than 2, i.e., 2 dominates 1. For the
sake of simplicity, we use a simple lattice 〈L,≤〉 with L = {low,high} and low ≤ high. In order to express the
Bell-LaPadula model in the context of Mobile Ambients, the following issues must be taken into account:
(1) both subjects and objects must be classiﬁed into different security levels;
(2) the No-Read up and No-Write down rules must be interpreted and formalised in the Mobile Ambients
framework, specifying how read/write actions are implemented.
As it is customary in static analysis, labels a ∈ Laba on boundaries and ambients, and labels t ∈ Labt on
transitions are introduced, both to determine the program points of interest during the analysis computation,
and to assign different security levels to ambients. The syntax of processes is then enriched with labels as follows,
where only the affected primitives are reported. Semantics is changed accordingly.
P ,Q ::= · · ·
| na [P ] ambient or boundary
| in
t
n .P capability to enter n
| out
t
n .P capability to exit n
| open
t
n .P capability to open n
The set of ambient labels Laba is partitioned into three disjoint sets:
– LabaH , labels of ambients classiﬁed high;
– LabaL, labels of ambients classiﬁed low;
– LabaB, labels of boundaries, which are neither low or high since they only aim at conﬁning conﬁdential
information.
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In all the examples, we will use the following notation for labels: b ∈ LabaB, h ∈ LabaH , m ∈ LabaL and c ∈ Labt ,
and the special label env ∈ LabaL to represent the external environment. In the rest of the paper, we will also
assume that the ambient and capability labels occurring in a process P are all distinct and consistent, i.e., an
ambient n is never labelled both as high and as low. Performing the control ﬂow analysis with all distinct labels
produces a more precise result that can be later approximated by equating some labels.
Since we consider the communication-free fragment of MA, we regard the ambient itself both as a subject
and an object, i.e., both as an active member performing a read/write operation, and as a passive resource.
This means that both data, processes and locations are abstractly represented as ambients. Moreover, there are
not explicit read and write actions, so they will be expressed in terms of capability actions.
As formalised by the barbed congruence notion presented in the previous section, an ambient is observable
(i.e., accessible) only at the environment level. Thus, in order to protect high-level ambients, we always enclose
them inside boundaries. In fact, the semantics of boundaries enforces two access rules that intuitively correspond
to the BLP ones:
– a boundary can only be opened by another boundary: this forbids boundaries to be dissolved by external
low level ambients;
– only boundaries can exit other boundaries: this forbids a high-level ambient to exit its protective boundary.
Notice that the ﬁrst rule controls access from low to high while the second one regulates access from high to
low. Intuitively, we can read these two rules as the BLP No Read up and No Write down. Entering a boundary
is always allowed modelling unrestricted information ﬂow from low to high.
Example 2.11. As an example, consider the following labelled process:
P4 = containerb1[[ hdata h[ outc1 container ] |
sendb2[[ outc2 container ]] ]] .
This process is an example of how boundaries may prevent direct information ﬂow. Ambient container is a
boundary protecting high level data hdata (note that data are abstractly represented as ambients): ambient hdata
cannot perform the out capability from boundary container, as it is prevented by the semantics of B-Ambients.
For this reason, hdata is never exposed to any ambient at environment level.
On the other hand, send, which is a boundary, may go out of containerwithout causing any direct information
leakage. In particular, P4 may only evolve to the state:
containerb1[[ hdata h[ outc1 container ] ]]
|
sendb2[[ 0 ]] .
3. Information ﬂow
The access control modelled in the ambient calculus is rather naive: a process may move into or out of a
particular ambient only if it owns the appropriate capability. The notion of security boundary can be seen as a
stricter access control mechanism, where some capability can be used only in a “secure” controlled way. Direct
information ﬂow is avoided “by construction” in the B-Ambient calculus. The intuition is the following: absence
of direct information ﬂow is guaranteed if, at run-time, every high-level datum or process is encapsulated into
at least one Boundary Ambient. In B-Ambients only boundaries may exit from, or open, boundaries, thus high-
level ambients always remain protected during the process execution if they are encapsulated inside a boundary
since the beginning. The problem of detecting indirect information ﬂow is more subtle: implicit information ﬂow
results from transmitting information via system side effects. In this case, the casual chain of events needs to be
detected, since a low-level action may depend on the presence of a high-level ambient.
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Fig. 5. Deﬁnition of function Nest.
This section is devoted to the formalisation of these concepts. The ﬁrst subsection discusses direct information
leakage, while the second one deﬁnes indirect information leakage in the B-Ambients setting.
3.1. Direct information ﬂow
The ﬂow of high-level ambients outside security boundaries is the downward ﬂow that the Bell-LaPadula
model intends to avoid. It may be formalised as follows. In the deﬁnition, we use both the functionNest reported
in Fig. 5 and the predicate Unprotected′(,R) described below.
The function Nest collects all the nestings among ambients/boundaries and capabilities of a given process
P with respect to an enclosing ambient/boundary labelled with : if P contains at top-level either an ambi-
ent/boundary labelled a or a capability labelled t, then the pair (, a) or (, t ), respectively, is added to the
result of the function.
Given an ambient/boundary labelled  and a set R ⊆ (Laba × (Laba ∪ Labt )) representing nestings among
ambients and capabilities, the predicate Unprotected′(,R) asserts that there is at least one path in R from
′ down to , in which none of the labels is of a boundary. In other words, there is no boundary protecting 
with respect to the enclosing ambient/boundary labelled ′. In the following, we will write Unprotected(,R)
whenever ′ = env.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Unprotected). Given a labelled process P and a set R ⊆ (Laba × (Laba ∪ Labt )),
Unprotected′(,R) = true iff ∃ 1, . . ., n ∈ LabaB(P) s.t. (′, 1), (1, 2), . . ., (n−1, n), (n, ) ∈ R.
On the converse, the predicate Protected′(,R) = ¬Unprotected′(,R) asserts that an ambient labelled
 is protected only if it is contained inside at least one boundary within ′. The above notion of Protected
and Unprotected is extended to paths as follows: a path P = 1, . . ., n is unprotected (protected) if ∀i ∈ [1, n],
i ∈ LabaB (∃i ∈ [1, n] s.t. i ∈ LabaB). To simplify the notation, we often write (Un)Protected(, P) in place of
(Un)Protected(,Nestenv(P)).
Example 3.2. Consider again process P4 of Example 2.11. The function Nestenv(P4) computes all the nestings
among ambients/boundaries and capabilities of process P4 with respect to the external environment, that is
Nestenv(P4) = {(env, b1), (b1, h), (h, c1), (b1, b2), (b2, c2)}. It is easy to verify that Protected(h, P4) is true, as h is
protected inside boundary b1.
Intuitively, a process P directly leaks information if, in at least one of its possible executions, one of its high-level
ambients results to be unprotected with respect to the external environment env.
Deﬁnition 3.3 (Direct information leakage). Given a labelled process P , P directly leaks secret h ∈ LabaH iff
∃Q, P →∗ Q such that Unprotected(h,Q).
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We can prove that any high level ambient which is initially nested inside (at least) one boundary, is never leaked
at run-time, i.e., B-Ambient access control rules forbid direct information leakage.
Proposition 3.4. [Absence of direct information leakage]. Given a labelled B-Ambient process P and a high level
label h ∈ LabaH , if Protected(h, P) then P does not directly leak secret h.
Proof. First, it can be easily proved by induction on the depth of derivations of P ≡ Q that congruence between
processes preserves their nestings, i.e., Nest(P) = Nest(Q). Then, it is sufﬁcient to prove by induction on the
derivation of P → Q that if Protected(h,Nest(P)) and P → Q, then Protected(h,Nest(Q))with respect
to an enclosing ambient/boundary labelled .
Base step: By case analysis on the axioms of Fig. 2.
(In-Red) Let P = na [ in
t
m .P ′ | Q ′] | ma ′[R ′] and Q = ma′ [ na [P ′ | Q′ ] |R ′ ] . In this case,
we have that:
– Nestenv(P) = {(env, a), (env, a′), (a, t )} ∪ Nesta(P ′) ∪ Nesta(Q′) ∪ Nesta′ (R′);
– Nestenv(Q) = {(env, a′), (a′ , a)} ∪ Nesta(P ′) ∪ Nesta(Q′) ∪ Nesta′ (R′).
In otherwords, after the reduction step, a newpair (a
′
, a) is added inNestenv(Q), modelling the nesting result-
ing after themove, while (env, a) and (a, t ) are absent since the capability has been consumed yielding ambi-
ent n inside m. All the other pairs are the same as in Nestenv(P). Assume Protected(h,Nestenv(P)) with h ∈
LabaH . This means that there are no paths of the form (env, 1), (1, 2), . . ., (n−1, n), (n, h) ∈ Nestenv(P) with
1, . . ., n ∈ LabaB. Suppose that the new pair generates an unprotected path, i.e., (env, a′),
(a
′
, a), (a, 1), . . ., (n, h) ∈ Nestenv(Q) with a′ , a, 1, . . ., n ∈ LabaB. In this case, also path (env, a),
(a, 1), . . ., (n, h) ∈ Nestenv(P) would be unprotected. This leads to a contradiction since we assumed that
Nestenv(P) is protected. Thus, Protected(h,Nestenv(Q)) holds.
(OutRed) Let P = ma′ [ n a [ out
t
m.P ′ | Q ′ ] | R ′ ] and Q = na [P ′ | Q ′ ] | ma ′[R ′], with m ∈ Bound ⇒
n ∈ Bound. In this case, we have that:
– Nestenv(P) = {(env, a′), (a′ , a), (a, t )} ∪ Nesta(P ′) ∪ Nesta(Q′) ∪ Nesta′ (R′);
– Nestenv(Q) = {(env, a), (env, a′)} ∪ Nesta(P ′) ∪ Nesta(Q′) ∪ Nesta′ (R′).
In other words, after the reduction step, a new pair (env, a) is added in Nestenv(Q), modelling the nesting
resulting after the move, while (a
′
, a) and (a, t ) are absent since the capability has been consumed yielding
ambient n out ofm. All the other pairs are the same as inNestenv(P). Let us assume Protected(h,Nestenv(P))
with h ∈ LabaH , i.e., there are no paths of the form (env, 1), (1, 2), . . ., (n−1, n), (n, h) ∈ Nestenv(P) with
1, . . ., n ∈ LabaB. If n is a boundary, then a ∈ LabaB, and the only new pair added to Nestenv(Q), i.e., (env, a),
cannot create any unprotected path from env to any h. If n is not a boundary, then also m is not a bound-
ary, and a, a
′ ∈ LabaB. Let us suppose there is a newunprotected path (env, a), (a, 1), . . ., (n−1, n), (n, h) ∈
Nestenv(Q), with 
a, 1, . . ., n ∈ LabaB. In this case, also path (env, a′), (a′ , a), (a, 1), . . .,
(n−1, n), (n, h) ∈ Nestenv(P) would be unprotected, which leads to a contradiction since we assumed that
Nestenv(P) was protected. Thus, we can conclude Protected(h,Nestenv(Q)) holds.
(OpenRed1) Let, P = na [ open
t
m.P ′ | ma ′ [Q ′] | R ′ ] and process Q = na [P ′ | Q ′ | R ′ ] with m ∈
Bound ⇒ n ∈ Bound. In this case, we have that:
– Nestenv(P) = {(env, a), (a, a′), (a, t )} ∪ Nesta(P ′) ∪ Nesta′ (Q′) ∪ Nesta(R′);
– Nestenv(Q) = {(env, a)} ∪ Nesta(P ′) ∪ Nesta(Q′) ∪ Nesta(R′).
In other words, after the reduction step, the pairs (a, a
′
) and (a, t ) are absent since the capability has
been consumed dissolving the ambient labelled a
′
. As a consequence, process Q′, which was contained
inside the opened ambient labelled a
′
, has been inherited by the dissolving ambient labelled a, i.e., in
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Nestenv(Q)we haveNesta(Q
′) instead ofNesta′ (Q
′). All the other pairs are the same as inNestenv(P). Assume
Protected(h,Nestenv(P)) holds with h ∈ LabaH , i.e., there are no paths of the form (env, 1), (1, 2), . . .,
(n−1, n), (n, h) ∈ Nestenv(P) with 1, . . ., n ∈ LabaB. If n is a boundary, then a ∈ LabaB, thus the fact that
in Nestenv(Q) there is Nesta(Q
′) instead of Nesta′ (Q
′) cannot create any unprotected path from env to
any h. If n is not a boundary, then also m is not a boundary, i.e., a, a
′ ∈ LabaB. Thanks to this condition,
the level of protection of the paths in Q′ is unchanged when the process is inside either a or a′ . Thus,
Protected(h,Nestenv(Q)) holds.
(OpenRed2) Let, P = open
t
m.P ′ | ma ′ [Q′] and Q = P ′ | Q′, with m ∈ Amb. In this case:
– Nestenv(P) = {(env, t ), (env, a′)} ∪ Nestenv(P ′) ∪ Nesta′ (Q′);
– Nestenv(Q) = Nestenv(P ′) ∪ Nestenv(Q′).
In other words, after the reduction step, the pairs (env, t ) and (env, a
′
) are absent since the capability has
been consumed dissolving the ambient labelled a
′
. For this reason, process Q′, which was contained inside
the opened ambient labelled a
′
, is at top-level, i.e., in Nestenv(Q) we have Nestenv(Q
′) instead of Nesta′ (Q
′).
All the other pairs are the same as in Nestenv(P). Assume Protected(h,Nestenv(P))with h ∈ LabaH , i.e., there
are no paths of the form (env, 1), (1, 2), . . ., (n−1, n), (n, h) ∈ Nestenv(P) with 1, . . ., n ∈ LabaB. Since m
can be only an ambient, with a
′ ∈ LabaB, the level of protection of the paths in Q′ is unchanged when the
process is inside either env or a
′
. Thus, Protected(h,Nestenv(Q)) holds.
Inductive step: By case analysis of the last rule applied among the ones in Fig. 2.
(ResRed) Let P = (n)P ′, Q = (n)Q′, and P ′ → Q′. By induction hypothesis, we have that
Protected(h,Nest(P
′)) implies Protected(h,Nest(Q′)). Since Nestenv((n)P ′) = Nestenv(P ′) and
Nestenv((n)Q
′) = Nestenv(Q′), then the implication holds on P and Q as well.
(AmbRed) Let P = na [P ′ ] ,Q = na [Q′ ] , and P ′ → Q′. Assume that Protected(h,Nestenv(P)) holds with
h ∈ LabaH and Nestenv(P) = {(env, a)} ∪Nesta(P ′). It follows that ambient n is not a high-level ambient (oth-
erwise there would be an unprotected path from env to a), i.e., a /= h, and that Protecteda(h,Nesta(P ′)).
By induction hypothesis, we have that Protecteda(h,Nesta(Q
′)). Then, since Nestenv(Q) = Nesta(Q′) ∪{(env, a)} and a /= h, Protected(h,Nestenv(Q)) holds as well.
(CompRed) Let P = P ′ | R, Q = Q′ | R, and P ′ → Q′. Assume that Protected(h,Nestenv(P)) with h ∈ LabaH
andNestenv(P) = Nestenv(P ′) ∪ Nestenv(R). Then,Protected(h,Nestenv(P ′))andProtected(h,Nestenv(R)).
By induction hypothesis, it holds that Protected(h,Nestenv(Q
′)). Then, since Nestenv(Q) = Nestenv(Q′) ∪
Nestenv(R), Protected(h,Nestenv(Q)) holds as well.
(≡ Red) Let P ≡ P ′ and Q ≡ Q′ and P ′ → Q′. By the fact that congruence between processes preserves their
nesting (i.e.,Nest(P) = Nest(P ′), ifP ≡ P ′), thenNestenv(P) = Nestenv(P ′).AssumeProtected(h,Nestenv(P))
holds, with h ∈ LabaH , then Protected(h,Nestenv(P ′)) holds as well. By induction hypothesis,
Protected(h,Nestenv(Q
′)). Again, since congruence between processes preserves their nesting,
Protected(h,Nestenv(Q)) holds as well. 
Example 3.5. Consider a simple cryptographic protocol, with two principals, alice and bob, willing to exchange
some conﬁdential information that need to be protected during the communication process. This can be mod-
elled by deﬁning two boundaries, one for each principal, and one high level ambient representing the conﬁdential
information. We need a mechanism for securely moving conﬁdential data from one boundary to the other. This
may be achieved through the introduction of a third boundary, encrypt, containing the critical data, whichmoves
out from the ﬁrst protected area and into the second one (i.e., behaving as a sort of encryption mechanism of
the conﬁdential data sent from one actor to the other). The protocol may be formalised as follows:
P5 = aliceb1[[ encrypt b2[[ outc1 alice.inc2 bob ]] | hdata h[ inc3 encrypt ] ]]
|
bobb3[[ openc4 encrypt | Q ]] .
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The conﬁdential datum hdata has the capability to enter encrypt ambient, which then migrates out of its parent
ambient alice and inside the sibling ambient bob. Process P5 may then evolve to the following state (see steps (a)
to (d) of Fig. 6):
aliceb1[[ ]]
|
bobb3[[ openc4 encrypt |Q | encrypt b2[[ hdata h[ ] ]] ]] ,
and, ﬁnally, through step (e) of Fig. 6, it reduces to:
aliceb1[[ ]] | bobb3[[Q | hdata h[ ] ]] .
Observe that encrypt is labelled as a boundary. Thus, the high-level datum hdata is protected by at least one
Boundary Ambient during the whole execution of the process, i.e., Protected(h,Q) is true for all Q such that
P5 →∗ Q. If it was not a boundary, it could not exit from alice because of the No Write down access control rule.
Furthermore, notice that alice could send an empty message to bob in case the encrypt ambient moves out of
alice before hdata enters it: such a situation can be avoided by making the speciﬁcation of the protocol more
deterministic.
3.2. Indirect information ﬂow
In this section, we turn to implicit information ﬂows. To this aim, we follow the standard approach based
on non-interference [22]. Informally, there is no information ﬂow from high to low if and only if the system
behaviour is not inﬂuenced by high-level values/processes, i.e, if and only if the high-level part of the system is
not able to inﬂuence the low-level one (see, e.g., [18,19,21] for more detail on non-interference-based properties).
Example 3.6. Let P6 be the following process:
P6 = containerb1[[ send b2[[ inc1 hdata.outc2 hdata.outc3 container ]] |
open
c4
download ]] .
In this process, send may exit from container because of the presence of hdata (e.g., in a downloaded application
which is opened once it enters container). There is no direct ﬂow, i.e., no high-level ambient exits container,
but a low-level user may deduce information about the presence of a high-level ambient in an implicit way, by
observing the overall system behaviour.
A formal deﬁnition of absence of information leakage based on non-interference can be obtained by adopting
the approach introduced in [1]. The key idea is that any perturbation, i.e., a substitution of high-level ambients’
names, should not affect the observable behaviour of the system. If this happens, we should be guaranteed that
no interference is possible from level high to low.
The perturbation is obtained by means of a substitution N which is a function that maps names in a set N
to different names, and leaves all the other names unchanged.
Deﬁnition 3.7 (Substitution function N ). Let N ∈ Names be a set of names. A substitution function N over N
is a function N : Names → Names, such that N (s) = s, whenever s ∈ N . We denote with PN the process P
in which N is applied to all the name occurrences.
The effect of applying a substitution N to a process P is essentially to replace each free occurrence of each
name in P . However, the replacement must be done in such a way that unintended capture of names by binders
is avoided, i.e., we assume that the bound names of processes are chosen to be different from their free names
and from the names of the substitutions.
If the set N represents a set of names that should be protected, i.e., high-level ambients, we may compare
the behaviour of the system before and after the perturbation using the contextual equivalence introduced in
Section 2.2, as follows.
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Fig. 6. alice and bob exchanging conﬁdential information.
Deﬁnition 3.8 (Absence of indirect information leakage). Let P be a process, N ⊆ Names be a set of names and
 be a set of contexts. P does not leak secrets N to  if and only if, for all substitution functions N , we have
P  PN .
Intuitively, N represents a set of names that should be protected, i.e., high-level ambients. Given a set of contexts
, we say that P does not leak high-level information to  if and only if any perturbation of such information
is not visible whenever P is executed in every context C ∈ . If this is the case, even after the perturbation, the
names that can be observed at the top-level of the process during the whole execution are the same, i.e., the
observational behaviour of P remains unchanged.
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Example 3.9. Consider again process P6 of Example 3.6. We show that it leaks name hdata by ﬁnding a context
that distinguishes P6 from P6{hdata}. Consider context C(_) = _ | downloadb3[[ inc5 container | hdata h[ 0 ] ]] ,
and substitution {hdata}(hdata) = hdata′. Then, process C(P6) is as follows:
C(P6) = containerb1[[ send b2[[ inc1 hdata.outc2 hdata.outc3 container ]] |
open
c4
download ]]
|
downloadb3[[ inc5 container | hdata h[ 0 ] ]] .
It is easy to verify that C(P6) ⇓ send , since after download enters container and it is opened, send can perform the
in and out capabilities over hdata, and then exit at top-level. On the contrary, in process C(P6{hdata}), ambient
send is blocked inside container:
C(P6{hdata}) = containerb1[[ send b2[[ inc1 hdata′.outc2 hdata′.outc3 container ]] |
open
c4
download ]]
|
downloadb3[[ inc5 container | hdata h [ 0 ] ]] .
In fact, after the renaming of hdata into hdata′, ambient send is stuck, trying to perform the in and out capabilities
over hdata′ before exiting container. Thus, send never reaches the top-level, i.e., C(P6{hdata}) ⇓ send . Therefore,
we can conclude that P6 ≈{C} P6{hdata}, i.e., that P6 indirectly leaks hdata to C(_).
4. Control ﬂow analysis for information leakage detection
So far, we have described how direct ﬂows are correctly prevented by suitable access control rules based on
boundaries, while indirect ﬂows are still possible. In Section 4.1, we deﬁne a control ﬂow analysis to statically
verify that a system P does not indirectly leak information.
This new analysis is an extension of the one presented in [5] which, in turns, extends the one of [28]. They all
aim at computing a safe approximation of the dynamic behaviour of Mobile Ambients programs. In particular,
in [28], the control structure computed by the analysis is expressed by the hierarchical structure of ambients,
given by the father-son relationship between the nodes of the tree structure, i.e., the analysis returns a set which
contains all the ambient nestings that are possible during run-time. In [5], we have considered nesting inside and
outside security boundaries separately, distinguishing between run-time nestings which are either protected, or
unprotected, as formalized in Deﬁnition 3.1. This leads to a more precise (i.e., less false negatives) and a more
efﬁcient (i.e., less spurious pairs recorded) analysis with respect to [28]. In order to detect indirect information
ﬂow, we further extend the analysis in two directions:
– we add a new component collecting an over-approximation of suspect ambients, i.e., ambients whose
behaviour may be inﬂuenced by the presence of high-level information during the run-time execution,
causing information to be indirectly leaked;
– we exploit the special semantics of boundaries, forbidding direct leakages, to achieve an even more precise
and efﬁcient analysis: given that some moves are forbidden, the possible nestings in Boundary Ambients
are usually less than in the standard Mobile Ambients.
The correctness of the analysis is reported in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, we show how the security result is
obtained by post-processing the result of the analysis: if the set of suspect ambients is protected during the whole
run-time execution, we are guaranteed that the system is interference-free.
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Fig. 7. Representation function for the control ﬂow analysis.
4.1. Speciﬁcation of the analysis for Boundary Ambients
The control ﬂow analysis is expressed in terms of a tuple (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ), where:
– The ﬁrst component Sˆ (suspect ambients) is an element of ℘(Names), where Names denotes the set
of stable names which are deﬁned below.
If a process contains an ambient n which is a high-level ambient, or whose execution is inﬂuenced by
high-level ambients (e.g., which performs capabilities over suspect ambients), then n should be in Sˆ .
– The second component IˆB is an element of ℘(Laba × (Laba ∪ Labt )). If a process contains either a capa-
bility or an ambient labelled  inside an ambient labelled a which is a boundary or an ambient nested
inside a boundary (referred as protected ambient from Deﬁnition 3.1), then (a, ) is expected to belong
to IˆB. Thus, IˆB is the set of protected run-time nestings, with B standing for Boundary.
– The third component IˆE is still an element of ℘(Laba × (Laba ∪ Labt )). If a process contains either a
capability or an ambient labelled  inside an ambient labelled a which is not protected, then (a, ) is
expected to belong to IˆE . Thus, IˆE is the set of unprotected run-time nestings, with E standing for External
environment.
– The forth component Hˆ ∈ ℘(Laba × Names) keeps track of the correspondence between names and
labels. If a process contains an ambient or a boundary labelled a with name n, then (a, n) is expected to
belong to Hˆ .
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Fig. 8. Speciﬁcation of the control ﬂow analysis.
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Notice that the usage of stable names aims at keeping the analysis result ﬁnite, as, by restriction and replica-
tion, a process may generate an inﬁnite number of different names at run-time. By following [28], we assume that
-conversion preserves stable names, i.e., whenever n is -converted to m we require that n = m. Intuitively,
n is a representative for a class of -convertible names. For the sake of readability, we always omit the ·
notation in the analysis speciﬁcation.
The set of solutions 〈{(Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ )},〉 is a complete lattice, with  deﬁned as (Sˆ ′, Iˆ ′B, Iˆ ′E , Hˆ ′)  (Sˆ ′′, Iˆ ′′B , Iˆ ′′E , Hˆ ′′)
iff Sˆ ′ ⊆ Sˆ ′′ ∧ Iˆ ′B ⊆ Iˆ ′′B ∧ Iˆ ′E ⊆ Iˆ ′′E ∧ Hˆ ′ ⊆ Hˆ ′′. The least upper bound operator, unionsq, used to combine the infor-
mation from the two lattices, is deﬁned by component-wise union. By exploiting the ordering operator, we are
able to compare the precision of different analyses: a “smaller” analysis is more precise than a “larger” one.
According to the control ﬂow framework in [29], the analysis is deﬁned by a representation function and an
analysis speciﬁcation. They are depicted, respectively, in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8.
The representation function aims at mapping concrete values to their best abstract representation. It is given
in terms of a function B,Proct(P) which recursively builds sets Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , and Hˆ corresponding to process P , with
respect to an enclosing ambient labelled with . Moreover, Proct is a Boolean ﬂag which is used to indicate if the
considered process is nested inside at least one boundary. In case Proct = true, all the forthcoming nestings will
be recorded as protected in IˆB. The representation function B(P) of a process P is deﬁned as Benv,False(P). Intu-
itively, function B(P) collects in IˆB (in IˆE) all the nestings of ambients and capabilities initially (not) contained
inside at least one boundary, whereas in Hˆ it records all the mappings between labels and ambients/boundaries.
Finally, Sˆ collects the name of high-level ambients, by exploiting the amb-rule.
Example 4.1. Consider again process P4 introduced in Section 2.3:
P4 = containerb1[[ hdata h[ outc1 container ] |
sendb2[[ outc2 container ]] ]] .
The representation function of P4 is B(P4) = ({hdata}, {(b1, h), (b1, b2), (h, c1), (b2, c2)}, {(env, b1)},
{(b1, container), (h, hdata), (b2, send)}). The ﬁrst component records that hdata, a high-level ambient, is a sus-
pect ambient, while the second and the third components capture all ambient nestings. The correspondence
between ambients and labels in P4 are kept by the last component, i.e., {(b1, container), (h, hdata), (b2, send)}.
The speciﬁcation states a closure condition of a tuple (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ )with respect to all possiblemoves executable
in a process P . The speciﬁcation rules of Fig. 8 depict how the process transforms one abstract representation
to another one, mimicking the process execution. They mostly amount to recursive checks of sub-processes
except for the three capabilities open, in, and out. After brieﬂy discussing the rules, in the next section we will
prove the correctness of the analysis by showing that every reduction of the semantics is properly mimicked in
the analysis. Within the speciﬁcation of the analysis, the predicate pathE(a, ) is used to simplify the notation.
Intuitively, it represents the existence of an unprotected path of nestings from ambient labelled a to ambient
labelled , in which none of the ambients is a boundary. The rules for capabilities are divided in two parts: (1)
the construction of sets IˆB and IˆE , which is done by reﬁning the analyses of [5,28] in order to correctly handle
boundaries and the new access control rules introduced in the B-Ambient calculus, and (2) the construction of
set Sˆ of suspect ambients.
We now describe the intuition behind the rule for the open-capability. The rule looks for all ambients m
labelled a with an open-capability open
t
n on an sibling ambient n labelled a
′
. Then, the result of performing
open
t
n should also be recorded in either IˆB or IˆE , depending on the level of protection of the newly generated
nestings. This step is split into two distinct cases: (i) the open is performed between unprotected (non-boundary)
ambients (ii) the open is performed between protected ambients/boundaries, requiring that if n is a boundary
then also m should be a boundary (because of the access control rule introduced by the B-Ambients semantics).
To record the effect of ﬁring the open-capability, all the children of the opened ambient n become children of m
in IˆE and IˆB, respectively.
The second part of the rule aims at collecting information about suspect ambients/boundaries: it requires
that ambients/boundaries potentially performing an open capability on a suspect ambient/boundary, have to
be considered suspect, as well.
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The rules for the in and out-capabilities behave similarly. They mainly differ in the ﬁrst part of the rule, where
IˆB and IˆE are constructed. The difference depends on the operational semantics of the B-Ambient calculus:
a in-capability can be performed independently on the “context” around the performing thread, whereas an
out-capability is constrained by the access control rule of Fig. 2. Moreover, in order to increase the precision of
the analysis, by considering the “context” around the ambient performing the capability, i.e., by distinguishing
between a protected and an unprotected environment, the rule is split into three sub-cases which correspond to
the different scenarios that may happen.
Example 4.2. Let P4 be the process of Example 4.1. It is possible to prove that the least solution of the analysis
for P4 is the tuple (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ), where Sˆ = {hdata}, IˆB = {(b1, h), (b1, b2), (h, c1), (b2, c2)}, IˆE = {(env, b1), (env, b2)},
and Hˆ = {(b1, container), (h, hdata), (b2, send)}. Notice that, with respect to B(P4), the analysis adds in IˆE the pair
(env, b2), representing the possibility for boundary send to exit the container. As there is no ambient/boundary
performing capabilities over hdata, the set Sˆ of suspect ambients/boundaries is not incremented, and contains
hdata only.
To see how information about suspect ambients/boudaries helps in detecting indirect information leakage,
consider again process P6 of Example 3.6.
P6 = containerb1[[ send b2[[ inc1 hdata .outc2 hdata .outc3 container ]] |
open
c4
download ]] .
We proved, in Example 3.9, that P6 indirectly leaks hdata. Consider now the least solution of the analy-
sis for P6, with hdata ∈ Sˆ , i.e., the tuple (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ), where Sˆ = {hdata, send}, IˆB = {(b1, b2), (b2, c1), (b2, c2),
(b2, c3), (b1, c4), }, IˆE = {(env, b1), (env, b2)}, and Hˆ = {(b1, container), (b2, send)}. In this case, send is suspect be-
cause of the capability performed on hdata. Notice also that the analysis reports a potential presence of send
at the environment level, thus capturing an indirect information leakage. In fact, send reaches the environment
only after testing the existence of the high level hdata ambient.
Example 4.3. We now give an example to motivate why we introduced the concept of suspect ambients in the
analysis of [5], instead of starting from the simpler nesting analysis of [28]. The motivation is actually the same
that we followed when developing the analysis of [5], i.e., increasing the precision by reﬁning the domain of the
analysis from a “ﬂat” set of nestings into the two distinct set of protected (IˆB) and unprotected (IˆE) nestings.
Consider the following process:
P7 = containerb1[[ test b2[[ inc1 hdata .outc2 hdata .inc3 ldata .outc4 ldata ]] ]]
| ldatal[ inc5 container ]
This process is intuitively secure since boundary test, which is suspect because of its access to high level data,
never exits container thus remaining protected in every possible execution. The least solution of the analysis
for P7, with hdata ∈ Sˆ , can be shown to be the tuple (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ), where Sˆ = {hdata, test}, IˆB = {(b1, b2), (b2, c1),
(b2, c2), (b2, c3), (b2, c4), (b1, l), (l, c5), (l, b2)}, IˆE = {(env, b1), (env, l), (l, c5)}, and Hˆ = {(b1, container), (b2, test),
(l, ldata)}. Analogously to the previous example, test is suspect because of the capability performed on hdata.
Notice also that the analysis reports the potential presence of test inside ldata, but this happens only after ldata
enters the container, i.e., when ldata is protected. In fact, the pair (l, b2) only appears into the set IˆB. From this
analysis we can conclude that process P7 does not leak hdata. In case we would use the simpler nesting analysis
of [28], we would obtain all the pairs in IˆE ∪ IˆB plus new nestings that might result when merging the two sets
of nestings. In this particular case, since ldata can be at the environment level and test can exit from ldata, we
also obtain that test can be at the environment level, i.e., the analysis returns the pair (env, b2), which would
erroneously make P7 appear insecure. The problem is that, when merging the nestings, we loose the information
about the fact that (l, b2) only happens when l is protected. This shows that choosing the simpler approach of
just one domain for nestings may lead to a strictly less precise analysis.
It is trivial to prove that the set {(Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) | B(P)  (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) ∧ (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B P } of solutions for a
process P is aMoore family, i.e., it is closed under greatest lower boundwith respect to the ordering. As a direct
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consequence, a least solution of the analysis always exists and it may be computed as follows: ﬁrst apply the
representation function to process P , then apply the analysis to validate the correctness of the proposed solution,
adding, if needed, new information to the tuple until a ﬁxed-point is reached. More formally, the ﬁxed-point
algorithm works as follows:
Algorithm 1 (Fixed-point algorithm).
Input: a labelled process P .
(i) Apply the representation function B to process P to get a tuple of the form (Sˆo, Iˆ oB , Iˆ
o
E , Hˆ );
(ii) for all the constraints of the speciﬁcation of the analysis, validate the tuple (Sˆi , Iˆ iB, Iˆ
i
E , Hˆ ) generated in (i):
(1) if the constraint is satisﬁed, continue;
(2) else, in case the constraint is not satisﬁed, this is due to the fact that either Sˆ i does not consider
suspect ambients, or Iˆ iB and Iˆ
i
E do not consider nestings that may actually occur. In this case, modify
Sˆ i , Iˆ iB, or Iˆ
i
E by adding the “missing” names or pairs, thus getting a new tuple (Sˆ
i+1, Iˆ i+1B , Iˆ
i+1
E , Hˆ ).
Then, go back to (ii) with i = i + 1.
The algorithm always terminates, since the number of process labels and names is ﬁnite. The complexity is
polynomial, as there is at most a quadratic number of nestings, bounding the number of iterations, and each
iteration is polynomial in the number of universal quantiﬁcations. For more efﬁcient versions of the above
algorithm, please refer to [7,31,32].
4.2. Correctness of the analysis
The correctness of the analysis is proven by showing that every reduction of the semantics is properly mim-
icked in the analysis. Intuitively, the theorem states that whenever (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B P and the representation
of P is contained in (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ), we are sure that every ambient that may exercise a capability on a suspect
ambient is suspect too and that every nesting of ambients and capabilities in every possible derivative of P is
also captured in (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ).
Theorem 4.4. [Subject reduction] Let P and Q be two processes such that B,Proct(P)  (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) ∧
(Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B P ∧ P → Q. Then, B,Proct(Q)  (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) ∧ (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B Q.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the derivation depth of P → Q.
Base step: By case analysis on the axioms of Fig. 2:
(InRed) Let process P = na [ in
t
m.P 1 | Q1 ] | ma
′ [R1] and process Q = ma
′ [ na[P1 | Q1] | R1] . Assume that
B
a
′′ ,Proct(P)  (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) ∧ (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B P . We obtain three different cases depending on the value of
Proct and on the label a:
(Proct = True) : B
a
′′ ,Proct(P)  (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) implies {(a
′′
, a
′
), (a
′′
, a), (a, t )} ⊆ IˆB; by (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B P
(case 1 of the in rule) we know that (a
′
, a) ∈ IˆB. By deﬁnition, B
a
′′ ,Proct(Q) = (s, {(a
′′
, a
′
), (a
′
, a)},∅,∅) unionsq
Ba,Proct(P1) unionsq Ba,Proct(Q1) unionsq Ba′ ,Proct(R1), differing from Ba′′ ,Proct(P) only on (a
′
, a), which we have just
proved to belong to IˆB. Thus, we have that B
a
′′ ,Proct(Q)  (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ). Moreover, Q differs from P only
in two nestings and in the absence of the in capability. Since changes just in the nestings do not have any
impact on the analysis (see rule amb), then (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B P implies (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B Q.
(Proct = False, a ∈ LabaB) : Ba′′ ,Proct(P)  (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) implies {(a
′′
, a
′
), (a
′′
, a)} ⊆ IˆE and {(a, t )} ⊆ IˆB;
the proof proceeds similarly to the case above by exploiting case 2 of the in rule;
(Proct = False, a ∈ LabaB) : Ba′′ ,Proct(P)  (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) implies {(a
′′
, a
′
), (a
′′
, a), (a, t )} ⊆ IˆE ; the proof
proceeds similarly to the cases above by exploiting case 3 of the in rule;
(OutRed) Let process P = ma′ [ na[ out
t
m.P 1 | Q1 ] | R1] and process Q = na [P1 | Q1] | ma
′ [R1]. We have
that P → Q only if a ∈ LabaB or a′ ∈ LabaB. Assume that Ba′′ ,Proct(P)  (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) ∧ (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B P .
We obtain three different cases depending on the value of Proct and on the label a:
480 C.Braghin et al. / Information and Computation 206 (2008) 460–489
(Proct = True) : B
a
′′ ,Proct(P)  (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) implies {(a
′′
, a
′
), (a
′
, a), (a, t )} ⊆ IˆB; by (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B P
(case 2 of the out rule) we know that (a
′′
, a) ∈ IˆB. By deﬁnition, B
a
′′ ,Proct(Q) = (s, {(a
′′
, a
′
), (a
′′
, a)},
∅,∅) unionsq Ba,Proct(P1) unionsq Ba,Proct(Q1) unionsq Ba′ ,Proct(R1), differing from Ba′′ ,Proct(P) only on (a
′′
, a) which we
have just proved to belong to IˆB. Thus, B
a
′′ ,Proct(Q)  (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ). Moreover, Q differs from P only in
two nestings and in the absence of the out capability. Since changes just in the nestings do not have any
impact on the analysis (see rule amb), then (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B P implies (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B Q.
(Proct = False, a ∈ LabaB) : Ba′′ ,Proct(P)  (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) implies that the pair (a
′′
, a
′
) ∈ IˆE , (a′ , a) ∈ IˆB ∪ IˆE
and (a, t ) ∈ IˆB; the proof proceeds similarly to the case above by exploiting case 1 of the out rule;
(Proct = False, a ∈ LabaB) : by the semantic constraint over boundaries we know that a ∈ LabaB implies
a
′ ∈ LabaB; thus Ba′′ ,Proct(P)  (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) implies {(a
′′
, a
′
), (a
′
, a), (a, t )} ⊆ IˆE ; the proof proceeds
similarly to the cases above by exploiting case 3 of the out rule;
(OpenRed1) Let process P = na [ open
t
m.P1 | m
a′ [Q1] | R1 ] and process Q = na [P1 | Q1| R1 ] . We have that
P → Q only if a ∈ LabaB or a′ ∈ LabaB. Assume that Ba′′ ,Proct(P)  (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) ∧ (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B P . We
obtain three different cases depending on the value of Proct and on the label a:
(Proct = True) : B
a
′′ ,Proct(P)  (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) implies {(a
′′
, a), (a, a
′
), (a, t )} ⊆ IˆB; by (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B P
(case 2 of the open rule) we know that {(a, )|(a′ , ) ∈ IˆB} ⊆ IˆB. By deﬁnition, B
a
′′ ,Proct(Q) = (s, {(a
′′
, a)},
∅,∅) unionsq Ba,Proct(P1) unionsq Ba,Proct(Q1) unionsq Ba,Proct(R1), differing from Ba′′ ,Proct(P) only on Ba,Proct(Q1) in place
of B
a
′ ,Proct(Q1) which is covered by the set {(a, )|(a
′
, ) ∈ IˆB} proved to belong to IˆB. Thus, B
a
′′ ,Proct(Q)
 (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ). Moreover, Q differs from P only in one nesting and in the absence of the open capa-
bility. Since changes just in the nestings do not have any impact on the analysis (see rule amb), then
(Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B P implies (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B Q.
(Proct = False, a ∈ LabaB) : the proof is the same as the case above apart from (a′′ , a) belonging to IˆE
instead of IˆB.
(Proct = False, a ∈ LabaB) : by the semantic constraint over boundaries we know that a ∈ LabaB implies
a
′ ∈ LabaB; thus Ba′′ ,Proct(P)  (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) implies {(a
′′
, a
′
), (a
′
, a), (a, t )} ⊆ IˆE ; the proof proceeds
similarly to the cases above by exploiting case 1 of the open rule;
(OpenRed2) Let P = open
t
m.P1 | m
a′ [Q1] andQ = P1 | Q1. We have that P → Q only if a′ ∈ LabaB. The proof
is analogous to the previous case.
Inductive step: It is easy by observing that renaming of bound names (-conversion) and structural congru-
ence do not have any effect on the process representation and on the analysis. In other words, P = Q or P ≡ Q
imply Ba,Proct(P) = Ba,Proct(Q) and (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B P if and only if (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B Q. 
4.3. Absence of indirect information leakage
The result of the analysis should be read, as expected, in termsof indirect informationﬂow: no indirect/implicit
leakage of information in a process P is possible at run-time if the set of suspect ambients remains protected
inside security boundaries during the whole execution. The main theorem shows that a process satisfying this
condition does not indirectly leak information towards any context that well-behaves with respect to the same
set of suspect ambients, i.e., contexts which do not introduce ﬂows by themselves.
Before stating the theorem, some additional deﬁnitions and a lemma need to be introduced. First, we need
to extend the Protected predicate of Deﬁnition 3.1 to deal with a set of ambient names rather than with the
label of a single ambient. Second, we deﬁne the set of processes in which the set of suspect ambients remains
protected during the run-time execution, and we call them protective processes. Finally, we prove that a process
which is protective with respect to Sˆ , remains protective when executed inside a context which well-behaves with
respect to the same set Sˆ .
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Given an analysis (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B P , we write Protected (Sˆ , (IˆE , Hˆ )) to denote that all suspect ambients
in Sˆ are protected with respect to the nestings IˆE and the labelling Hˆ . Formally, for every n ∈ Sˆ and for every
label  such that ∃(, n) ∈ Hˆ , it holds Protected(, IˆE).
The set
Sˆ
of all the processes which are protective with respect to a given set of suspect ambients Sˆ , is deﬁned
as follows. Notice that the deﬁnition can be extended to contexts: a context C well-behaves with respect to Sˆ ,
written C ∈ 
Sˆ
if C(0) ∈ 
Sˆ
.
Deﬁnition 4.5 (Protective process). A process P is protective with respect to Sˆ , written
P ∈ 
Sˆ
iff
(i) ∃IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ : B(P)  (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) and (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B P ;
(ii) Protected (Sˆ , (IˆE , Hˆ )).
Given the deﬁnition of protective process, the following lemma states that a process which is protective with
respect to Sˆ , remains protective when executed inside a context which well-behaves with respect to the same set
Sˆ .
Lemma 4.6. Let P ∈ 
Sˆ
and C ∈ 
Sˆ
. Then, C(P) ∈ 
Sˆ
.
Proof. By Deﬁnition 4.5, we need to prove that, let B(P)  (Sˆ , Iˆ ′B, Iˆ ′E , Hˆ ′), (Sˆ , Iˆ ′B, Iˆ ′E , Hˆ ′) |=B P and
Protected (Sˆ , (Iˆ ′E , Hˆ ′)), and let B(C( testt[ 0 ] ))  (Sˆ , Iˆ ′′B , Iˆ ′′E , Hˆ ′′), (Sˆ , Iˆ ′′B , Iˆ ′′E , Hˆ ′′) |=B C( testt[ ] ), with test ∈
Sˆ ∪ fn(C), and Protected (Sˆ , (Iˆ ′′E , Hˆ ′′)), then:
(i) ∃Iˆ ′′′B , Iˆ ′′′E , Hˆ ′′′ : B(C(P))  (Sˆ , Iˆ ′′′B , Iˆ ′′′E , Hˆ ′′′) and (Sˆ , Iˆ ′′′B , Iˆ ′′′E , Hˆ ′′′) |=B C(P);
(ii) Protected (Sˆ , (Iˆ ′′′E , Hˆ ′′′)).
In order to build a valid analysis of C(P) it sufﬁces ﬁnding a suitable tuple (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) as an input to the
ﬁxed-point algorithm 1. Sets IˆB, IˆE , and Hˆ can be easily chosen as follows:
1. IˆB can be built by taking the union of sets Iˆ ′B, Iˆ ′′B and Iˆ ′E (it could be the case that the hole in the context
is protected, thus every nesting in P may become protected as well), with all the occurrences of env in
Iˆ ′B (or Iˆ ′E) substituted with the label t of ambient test (step 1). Then (step 2), test ambient, which is only a
placeholder of the hole in context C is passed. Finally (step 3), all the pairs containing the label t of ambient
test are removed. IˆE is built similarly; the only difference is in step 1, where only the union of Iˆ ′E and Iˆ ′′E is
taken.
step 1: IˆB = Iˆ ′B ∪ Iˆ ′′B ∪ Iˆ ′E[t/env] and IˆE = Iˆ ′E[t/env] ∪ Iˆ ′′E .
step 2: IˆB = IˆB ∪ {(, ′) | (, t), (t, ′) ∈ IˆB} and IˆE = IˆE ∪ {(, ′) | (, t), (t, ′) ∈ IˆE}.
step 3: IˆB = IˆB \ {(, ′) |  ∨ ′ = t} and IˆE = IˆE \ {(, ′) |  ∨ ′ = t}.
Sets IˆB and IˆE represent all the nesting of process C(P), in which no interaction between the context C and
P have been considered, i.e., where the execution of C and P have been considered separately by the two
control ﬂow analyses.
2. Since labels are supposed to be all different, we can build Hˆ as the union of Hˆ ′ and Hˆ ′′, i.e., Hˆ = Hˆ ′ ∪ Hˆ ′′.
Starting with (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ), we apply a standard ﬁxed-point algorithm to ﬁnd a solution of the set of con-
straints specifying the analysis of process C(P). The algorithm checks all the constraints and, in case one of them
does not hold, it adds either the missing nesting to IˆE or IˆB, or the name of a suspect ambient to the set Sˆ , or
both. The algorithm terminates when a ﬁxed-point is reached, which constitutes a valid analysis that satisﬁes
case (i) above.
We prove, by induction on the algorithm steps, that the algorithm never adds a suspect name to Sˆ , i.e., the
solution is of the form (Sˆ , Iˆ nB , Iˆ
n
E , Hˆ ), with n being the number of algorithm’s steps performed to reach the ﬁxed-
point, and with Iˆ nB ⊇ IˆB and Iˆ nE ⊇ IˆE (that is, Sˆ i = Sˆ0 for all i ≥ 1). Moreover, by contradiction, we prove that
for any new pair added to IˆE (new pairs in IˆB do not change the protectivity of a process) the process remains
protective with respect to Sˆ , i.e., Protected(Sˆ , (Iˆ nE , Hˆ )) still holds (case (ii) above).
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Base step (i = 0): The only pairs that can violate the Case 2-clause of the in, out, or open rules are the ones
that have been added when building IˆE from Iˆ ′E and Iˆ ′′E (the same holds for IˆB) which are of the form (, ′)
such that (, t), (t, ′) ∈ IˆE . Assume that one of these pairs requires a name m to be added to Sˆ0: this would
imply that ′ is the label of a capability which has a suspect name as target. Thus, also t should be the label
of a suspect ambient. Since t represents env in Iˆ
′
E , we would have env suspect in P , contradicting the fact that
Protected (Sˆ , (Iˆ ′E , Hˆ ′)). Thus, no new names are added to Sˆ0, and Sˆ1 = Sˆ0.
Set IˆE , constructed from Iˆ
′
E and Iˆ
′′
E , is such that Protected (Sˆ , (IˆE , Hˆ )). This follows by the construction of
C(P), and by the fact that we have that Protected (Sˆ , (Iˆ ′E , Hˆ ′)) and Protected (Sˆ , (Iˆ ′′E , Hˆ ′′)).
Inductive step (i): Assume that at this step the algorithm is adding the pair (, ′) to Iˆ iE (or Iˆ iB), i.e., Iˆ
i+1
E =
Iˆ iE ∪ {(, ′)} (or Iˆ i+1B = Iˆ iB ∪ {(, ′)}). By inductive hypothesis assume also that Sˆj = Sˆ0 for all j ≤ i. We con-
sider all the clauses in which the pair (, ′) could have been added:
(in): Case 2 of in-rule requires m ∈ Sˆ i+1 if  ∈ LabaH (i.e., if the target ambient of the capability is high-
level), with Sˆ i+1 = Sˆ i ∪ {m}, and m the name of an ambient containing the capability in
t
n. If  ∈ LabaH
then, since (, n) ∈ Hˆ , n ∈ Sˆ0, i.e., ambient n is suspect since the ﬁrst step of the ﬁxed-point algorithm.
In addition, consider the in
t
n capability inside m:
– either it is inside m since the ﬁrst step of the algorithm. In this case, m in C(P) is of the form
m
′ [ in
t
n .P | Q ] , and m is suspect in Sˆ0 since the construction of the starting tuple (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ );
– or it has been inherited at one the previous steps of the algorithm (step k , with 0 < k < i), by the
application of the open-clause to an ambient x containing the in-capability. In this case,m is of the
form m
′ [ open
′
tx.P | x′′ [ in
t
n.Q] | R ] and x is a suspect ambient, since it contains a capability
with a suspect ambient as a target; moreover, x ∈ Sˆk and Sˆk = Sˆ0 by inductive hypothesis. Case 2
of the open-rule requiresm ∈ Sˆk+1 if x ∈ Sˆk , and, by inductive hypothesis, we have that Sˆk+1 = Sˆ0,
i.e., also ambient m is suspect since the ﬁrst step of the algorithm.
In both cases, we have that m ∈ Sˆ i . Thus Sˆ i+1 = Sˆ i (= Sˆ0).
It remains to show that the process remains protective. Assume by contradiction that the new pair (, ′)
makes a suspect ambient become unprotected, that is, ∃s ∈ Sˆ , with (, s) ∈ Hˆ s.t. Unprotected(, IˆE),
i.e., there exists a path (env, 1), (1, 2), . . . , (, ′), . . . , (n, ) ∈ Iˆ i+1E such that 1, 2, . . . , n, , ′ ∈ LabaB.
However, the in-rule adds the pair (, ′) to Iˆ iE only if there exists a label ′′ such that:
– (′, t ), (′′, ′), (′′, ) ∈ Iˆ iE ∪ Iˆ iB and ′ ∈ LabaB, which leads to a contradiction.
– (′′, ′) ∈ Iˆ iE and (′′, ) ∈ Iˆ iE . Also in this case we obtain a contradiction, since we would have that
s is unprotected also at the previous step because there would have been an unprotected path
(env, 1), (1, 2), . . . , (′′, ′), . . . , (n, ) ∈ Iˆ i+1E , with 1, 2, . . . , n, , ′, ′′ ∈ LabaB, which leads to a
contradiction.
(out): Case 2 of out-rule requires m ∈ Sˆ i+1 if  ∈ LabaH (i.e., if the target ambient of the capability is high-
level), with Sˆ i+1 = Sˆ i ∪ {m}, andm the name of an ambient containing the capability out
t
n. If  ∈ LabaH
then, since (, n) ∈ Hˆ , n ∈ Sˆ0, i.e., ambient n is suspect since the ﬁrst step of the ﬁxed-point algorithm.
In addition, consider the out
t
n capability inside m:
– either it is inside m since the ﬁrst step of the algorithm. In this case m in C(P) is of the form
m
′ [ out
t
n.P | Q ] , and m is suspect in Sˆ0 as derived when building the starting tuple (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ );
– or it has been inherited at one the previous steps of the algorithm (step k , with k < i), by the appli-
cation of the open-clause to an ambient x containing the out-capability. In this case, m is of the
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form m
′ [ open
′
t x.P | x′′ [ out
t
n .Q ] |R ] and x is a suspect ambient, since it contains a capability
with a suspect ambient as a target; moreover, x ∈ Sˆk and Sˆk = Sˆ0 by inductive hypothesis. Case 2
of the open-rule requiresm ∈ Sˆk+1 if x ∈ Sˆk , and, by inductive hypothesis, we have that Sˆk+1 = Sˆ0,
i.e., also ambient m is suspect since the ﬁrst step of the algorithm.
In both cases, we have that m ∈ Sˆ i , thus Sˆ i+1 = Sˆ i (= Sˆ0).
It remains to show that the process remains protective. Assume by contradiction that the
new pair (, ′) makes a suspect ambient become unprotected, that is, ∃s ∈ Sˆ , with (, s) ∈ Hˆ s.t.
Unprotected(, IˆE), i.e., there exists a path (env, 1), (1, 2), . . . , (, ′), . . . , (n, ) ∈ Iˆ i+1E such that
1, 2, . . . , n, , ′ ∈ LabaB. However, the out-rule adds the pair (, ′) to Iˆ iE only if there exists a label ′′
such that:
– (, ′′) ∈ Iˆ iE , (′′, ′) ∈ Iˆ iE ∪ Iˆ iB, and ′ ∈ LabaB, which leads to a contradiction.
– (, ′′) ∈ Iˆ iE and (′′, ′) ∈ Iˆ iE . Also in this case we obtain a contradiction, since we would have
that s is unprotected also at the previous step because there would have been an unprotected path
(env, 1), (1, 2), . . . , (, ′′), (′′, ′), . . . , (n, ) ∈ Iˆ i+1E ,with1, 2, . . . , n, , ′, ′′ ∈ LabaB,which leads
to a contradiction.
(open): Case 2 of open-rule requires m ∈ Sˆ i+1 if  ∈ LabaH (i.e., if the target ambient of the capability is
high-level), with Sˆ i+1 = Sˆ i ∪ {m}, and m the name of an ambient containing the capability open
t
n . If
 ∈ LabaH then, since (, n) ∈ Hˆ , n ∈ Sˆ0, i.e., ambient n is suspect since the ﬁrst step of the ﬁxed-point
algorithm. In addition, consider the open
t
n capability inside m:
– either it is inside m since the ﬁrst step of the algorithm. In this case, m in C(P) is of the form
m
′ [ open
t
n.P |Q ] , andm is suspect in Sˆ0 as derivedwhen building the starting tuple (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ );
– or it has been inherited at one the previous steps of the algorithm (step k , with k < i), by the
application of the open-clause to an ambient x containing the open-capability. In this case, m is
of the form m
′ [ open
′
t x.P |x ′′ [open
t
n.Q] | R ] and x is a suspect ambient, since it contains a
capability with a suspect ambient as a target; moreover, x ∈ Sˆk and Sˆk = Sˆ0 by inductive hypoth-
esis. Case 2 of the open-rule requiresm ∈ Sˆk+1 if x ∈ Sˆk , and, by inductive hypothesis, we have that
Sˆk+1 = Sˆ0, i.e., also ambient m is suspect since the ﬁrst step of the algorithm.
In both cases, we have that m ∈ Sˆ i . Thus Sˆ i+1 = Sˆ i (= Sˆ0).
It remains to show that the process remains protective. Assume by contradiction that the new
pair (, ′) makes a suspect ambient become unprotected. In this case, ∃s ∈ Sˆ , with (, s) ∈ Hˆ s.t.
Unprotected(, IˆE), i.e., there exists a path (env, 1), (1, 2), . . . , (, ′), . . . , (n, ) ∈ Iˆ i+1E such that
1, 2, . . . , n, , ′ ∈ LabaB. The open-rule adds the pair (, ′) to Iˆ iE only if there exists a label ′′ such that
(, ′′), (′′, ′) ∈ Iˆ iE and ′′ ∈ LabaB. This means that s is unprotected also at the previous step because
there would have been an unprotected path (env, 1), (1, 2), . . . , (, ′′), (′′, ′), . . . , (n, ) ∈ Iˆ i+1E , with
labels 1, 2, . . . , n, , ′, ′′ ∈ LabaB, thus leading to a contradiction.
The algorithm above always terminates since at most all possible (ﬁnite) nestings are added to IˆE and
IˆB. Let n be the number of algorithm’s steps performed in order to reach a ﬁxed-point, and let Iˆ ′′′B = Iˆ nB ,
Iˆ ′′′E = Iˆ nE , and Hˆ ′′′ = Hˆ , then we have proved that ∃Iˆ ′′′B , Iˆ ′′′E , Hˆ ′′′ such that (Sˆ , Iˆ ′′′B , Iˆ ′′′E , Hˆ ′′′) |=B C(P) (the sec-
ond part of case (i) of the Lemma). Moreover, by B(C(P))  (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) (easily proved by the hypotheses
B(P)  (Sˆ , Iˆ ′B, Iˆ ′E , Hˆ ′), B(C( testt[ ] ))  (Sˆ , Iˆ ′′B , Iˆ ′′E , Hˆ ′′)), and by the fact that Iˆ nB ⊇ IˆB and Iˆ nE ⊇ IˆE , it follows that
B(C(P))  (Sˆ , Iˆ ′′′B , Iˆ
′′′
E , Hˆ
′′′
E ) (the ﬁrst part of case (i) of the Lemma). We have also proved that
Protected (Sˆ , (Iˆ ′′′E , Hˆ ′′′)) still holds (case (ii) of the Lemma). 
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The proof of the main theorem relies on a function, ns, which takes as arguments a process P and a set Sˆ of
ambient/boundary names, and returns process P with all ambients/boundaries belonging to Sˆ , together with the
sub-processes they include, syntactically replaced by 0 .
More formally, a transformation function ns(P , Sˆ) on process P with suspects names Sˆ is deﬁned as follows:
ns((n)P , Sˆ) ≡
{
ns(P , Sˆ) ifn ∈ Sˆ
(n)ns(P , Sˆ) ifn ∈ Sˆ
ns(0 , Sˆ) ≡ 0
ns(P | Q, Sˆ) ≡ ns(P , Sˆ) | ns(Q, Sˆ)
ns(!P , Sˆ) ≡ !ns(P , Sˆ)
ns( n[P ] , Sˆ) ≡
{
0 ifn ∈ Sˆ
n[ ns (P , Sˆ) ] ifn ∈ Sˆ
ns(in n .P, Sˆ) ≡ in n .ns(P, Sˆ)
ns(out n .P, Sˆ) ≡ out n .ns(P, Sˆ)
ns(open n .P, Sˆ) ≡ open n .ns(P, Sˆ)
The following properties immediately follow from the deﬁnition above, and will be useful when proving the
main theorem.
Lemma 4.7. Let P ∈ Proc be of the form P = n[ in m .P1 | Q1] | m [R1] , n,m ∈ Sˆ. If ns(P , Sˆ) ≡ ns(P ′, Sˆ ′), then
P ′ ≡ (k1, . . . , kz) n[ in m .P2 | Q2 ] | m [R2] | P3 with:
– m, n ∈ Sˆ ′, and ki ∈ Sˆ ′ ∀i ≤ z, z ≥ 0;
– ns(P1, Sˆ) ≡ ns(P2, Sˆ ′), ns(Q1, Sˆ) ≡ ns(Q2, Sˆ ′), ns(R1, Sˆ) ≡ ns(R2, Sˆ ′), and ns(P3, Sˆ ′) ≡ 0 .
Lemma 4.8. Let P ∈ Proc be of the form P = m[n[ out m.P1 | Q1 ] | R1] ,m , n ∈ Sˆ. If ns(P , Sˆ) ≡ ns(P ′, Sˆ ′), then
P ′ ≡ (k1, . . . , kz) m[ n [ out m.P2 | Q2 ] | R3] | P3 with:
– m, n ∈ Sˆ ′, and ki ∈ Sˆ ′ ∀i ≤ z, z ≥ 0;
– ns(P1, Sˆ) ≡ ns(P2, Sˆ ′), ns(Q1, Sˆ) ≡ ns(Q2, Sˆ ′), ns(R1, Sˆ) ≡ ns(R2, Sˆ ′), and ns(P3, Sˆ ′) ≡ 0 .
Lemma 4.9. Let P ∈ Proc be of the form P = n[ open m.P1 | m[Q1] | R1 ] ,m, n ∈ Sˆ. If ns(P , Sˆ) ≡ ns(P ′, Sˆ ′), then
P ′ ≡ (k1, . . . , kz) n[ open m.P2 | m[Q2] | R2] | P3 with:
– m, n ∈ Sˆ ′, and ki ∈ Sˆ ′ ∀i ≤ z, z ≥ 0;
– ns(P1, Sˆ) ≡ ns(P2, Sˆ ′), ns(Q1, Sˆ) ≡ ns(Q2, Sˆ ′), ns(R1, Sˆ) ≡ ns(R2, Sˆ ′), and ns(P3, Sˆ ′) ≡ 0 .
Lemma 4.10. Let P ∈ Proc be of the form P = open m.P1 | m[Q1] , m ∈ Sˆ. If ns(P , Sˆ) ≡ ns(P ′, Sˆ ′), then P ′ ≡
(k1, . . . , kz)open m.P2 | m[Q2] | P3, with:
– m ∈ Sˆ ′, and ki ∈ Sˆ ′ ∀i ≤ z, z ≥ 0;
– ns(P1, Sˆ) ≡ ns(P2, Sˆ ′), ns(Q1, Sˆ) ≡ ns(Q2, Sˆ ′), and ns(P3, Sˆ ′) ≡ 0 .
Lemma 4.11. If ns(P , Sˆ) ≡ 0 , then P ≡ (n1, . . . , nt ,m1, . . . ,mz) n1 [P1] | · · · | nk [Pk ] with ni ∈ Sˆ ∀i ≤ k, k ≥ 0,
0 ≤ t ≥ k, and mi ∈ Sˆ ′ ∀i ≤ z, z ≥ 0.
We now show how the previously deﬁned control ﬂow may be applied to prove absence of (indirect) infor-
mation ﬂow in a given process P : if the set of suspect ambients is protected during the whole run-time execution,
we are guaranteed that the system is interference-free.
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Theorem 4.12. [Absence of information leakage] If P ∈ 
Sˆ
, then, P does not leak N ⊆ Sˆ to 
Sˆ
.
Proof. We have to prove that, if (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B P ∧ Protected (Sˆ , (IˆE , Hˆ )), then, for all substitution func-
tions N , we have P 
Sˆ
PN , i.e., that P does not leak N to Sˆ . To do this, by exploiting Proposition 2.10, we
prove P ≈
Sˆ
PN . This amounts of proving that, for all well-behaving contexts C ∈ Sˆ , we have C(P) ≈ C(PN ).
In the proof, we proceed as follows:
1. we deﬁne a symmetric relation S , which is proven to be a bisimulation, i.e, we prove that, if (P , P ′) ∈ S ,
then:
(i) P ↓ n implies P ′ ↓ n;
(ii) P −→ Q implies that ∃Q′ such that P ′ −→∗ Q′ and (Q,Q′) ∈ S .
2. we prove that P and PN are barbed congruent up to Sˆ , i.e., we prove that (C(P), C(PN )) ∈ S for all
contexts C ∈ 
Sˆ
.
Without loss of generality, in the following, we will consider only the case in which P ′ does not have high
names restricted. By using the function ns deﬁned above, we are now able to deﬁne a relation S as follows:
S = { (P , P ′) | ∃(Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ), (Sˆ ′, Iˆ ′B, Iˆ ′E , Hˆ ′)s.t.B(P)  (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ),
B(P ′)  (Sˆ , Iˆ ′B, Iˆ ′E , Hˆ ′), (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B P , (Sˆ ′, Iˆ ′B, Iˆ ′E , Hˆ ′) |=B P ′,
Protected (Sˆ , (IˆE , Hˆ )),Protected (Sˆ ′, (Iˆ ′E , Hˆ ′)), ns(P , Sˆ) ≡ ns(P ′, Sˆ ′)}.
We now prove that S is a bisimulation (step 1 of the proof):
(i) By hypothesis (P , P ′) ∈ S and, by deﬁnition of S , this means that ns(P , Sˆ) ≡ ns(P ′, Sˆ ′). The two processes
are then structurally equivalent up to suspect names, which are never exhibited since by hypothesis we
have Protected (Sˆ , (IˆE , Hˆ )) and Protected (Sˆ ′, (Iˆ ′E , Hˆ ′)). Thus, P and P ′ exhibit the same names.
(ii) The proof is by induction on the depth of the derivation P −→ Q:
Base step: By case analysis on the axioms of Fig. 2.
(InRed) Let P = n[ in m.P1 | Q1 ] | m[R1 ] and Q = m[n[P1 | Q1] | R1 ] . Assume that (P , P ′) ∈ S . Then:
− ∃(Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ )s.t. :(Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B P ∧ Protected (Sˆ , (IˆE , Hˆ ));
− ∃(Sˆ ′, Iˆ ′B, Iˆ ′E , Hˆ ′)s.t. :(Sˆ ′, Iˆ ′B, Iˆ ′E , Hˆ ′) |=B P ′ ∧ Protected (Sˆ ′, (Iˆ ′E , Hˆ ′));
− ns(P , Sˆ) ≡ ns(P ′, Sˆ ′).
By Theorem 4.4 and the assumptions above, we derive that (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B Q, and consequently that Q is a
protective process. For this reason, n,m ∈ Sˆ , then, by Lemma 4.7, P ′ ≡ n[ in m.P2 | Q 2 ] | m[R2] | P3, with:
(1) n,m ∈ Sˆ ′;
(2) ns(P1, Sˆ) ≡ ns(P2, Sˆ ′), ns(Q1, Sˆ) ≡ ns(Q2, Sˆ ′), ns(R1, Sˆ) ≡ ns(R2, Sˆ ′), and ns(P3, Sˆ ′) ≡ 0 ;
(3) P3 = 0 since we assumed P ′ to be a protective process.
By applying (InRed) to P ′, we get Q′ ≡ m[ n [P2 | Q2 ] | R2] | P3, where P3 ≡ 0 . By Theorem 4.4, we can
derive that (Sˆ ′, Iˆ ′B, Iˆ ′E , Hˆ ′) |=B Q′, and, by (1), (2) and (3) above, we get that ns(Q, Sˆ) ≡ ns(Q′, Sˆ ′). By the deﬁ-
nition of S , it follows that (Q,Q′) ∈ S .
(OutRed) Let P = m[ n [ out m.P1 | Q1] | R1 ] and Q = n[P1 | Q1] | m[R1 ] . Assume that (P , P ′) ∈ S , then:
− ∃(Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ )s.t. :(Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B P ∧ Protected (Sˆ , (IˆE , Hˆ ));
− ∃(Sˆ ′, Iˆ ′B, Iˆ ′E , Hˆ ′)s.t. :(Sˆ ′, Iˆ ′B, Iˆ ′E , Hˆ ′) |=B P ′ ∧ Protected (Sˆ ′, (Iˆ ′E , Hˆ ′));
− ns(P , Sˆ) ≡ ns(P ′, Sˆ ′).
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By Theorem 4.4 and the assumptions above, we derive that (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B Q, and consequently that Q is a
protective process. For this reason, n,m ∈ Sˆ , then, by Lemma 4.8, P ′ ≡ m[ n [ out m.P2 | Q2] | R3 ] | P3, with:
(1) n,m ∈ Sˆ ′;
(2) ns(P1, Sˆ) ≡ ns(P2, Sˆ ′), ns(Q1, Sˆ) ≡ ns(Q2, Sˆ ′), ns(R1, Sˆ) ≡ ns(R2, Sˆ ′), and ns(P3, Sˆ ′) ≡ 0 ;
(3) P3 = 0 since we assumed P ′ to be a protective process.
By applying (OutRed) to P ′, we get Q′ ≡ n[P2 | Q2 ] | m[R2] | P3, where P3 ≡ 0 . By Theorem 4.4, we
can derive that (Sˆ ′, Iˆ ′B, Iˆ ′E , Hˆ ′) |=B Q′, and, by (1), (2) and (3) above, we get that ns(Q, Sˆ) ≡ ns(Q′, Sˆ ′). By the
deﬁnition of S , it follows that (Q,Q′) ∈ S .
(OpenRed1)Let P = n[ open m.P1 | m[Q1] | R1 ] and Q = n[P1 | Q1 | R1 ] . Let us assume that (P , P ′) ∈ S ,
then:
− ∃(Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ )s.t. :(Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B P ∧ Protected (Sˆ , (IˆE , Hˆ ));
− ∃(Sˆ ′, Iˆ ′B, Iˆ ′E , Hˆ ′)s.t. :(Sˆ ′, Iˆ ′B, Iˆ ′E , Hˆ ′) |=B P ′ ∧ Protected (Sˆ ′, (Iˆ ′E , Hˆ ′));
− ns(P , Sˆ) ≡ ns(P ′, Sˆ ′).
By Theorem 4.4 and the assumptions above, we derive that (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B Q, and consequently that Q
is a protective process. For this reason, m ∈ Sˆ , then, it follows that: If n,m ∈ Sˆ , then, by Lemma 4.9, P ′ ≡
n[ open m.P2 | m[Q2] | R2] | P3, with:
(1) n,m ∈ Sˆ ′;
(2) ns(P1, Sˆ) ≡ ns(P2, Sˆ ′), ns(Q1, Sˆ) ≡ ns(Q2, Sˆ ′), ns(R1, Sˆ) ≡ ns(R2, Sˆ ′), and ns(P3, Sˆ ′) ≡ 0 .
By applying (OpenRed1) to P ′, we get Q′ ≡ m[P2 | Q2 | R2] | P3, where P3 ≡ 0 . By Theorem 4.4, we can
derive that (Sˆ ′, Iˆ ′B, Iˆ ′E , Hˆ ′) |=B Q′, and, by (1) and (2) above, we get that ns(Q, Sˆ) ≡ ns(Q′, Sˆ ′). By the deﬁnition
of S , it follows that (Q,Q′) ∈ S .
(OpenRed2)Let P = open m.P1 | m[Q1] and Q = P1 | Q1. Assume that (P , P ′) ∈ S , then:
− ∃(Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ )s.t. :(Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B P ∧ Protected (Sˆ , (IˆE , Hˆ ));
− ∃(Sˆ ′, Iˆ ′B, Iˆ ′E , Hˆ ′)s.t. :(Sˆ ′, Iˆ ′B, Iˆ ′E , Hˆ ′) |=B P ′ ∧ Protected (Sˆ ′, (Iˆ ′E , Hˆ ′));
− ns(P , Sˆ) ≡ ns(P ′, Sˆ ′).
By Theorem 4.4 and the assumptions above, we derive that (Sˆ , IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ ) |=B Q, and consequently that Q is a
protective process. For this reason, m ∈ Sˆ , then, by Lemma 4.10, P ′ ≡ open m.P2 | m[Q2] | P3, with:
(1) m ∈ Sˆ ′;
(2) ns(P1, Sˆ) ≡ ns(P2, Sˆ ′), ns(Q1, Sˆ) ≡ ns(Q2, Sˆ ′), and ns(P3, Sˆ ′) ≡ 0 ;
(3) P3 = 0 since we assumed P ′ to be a protective process as well.
By applying (OpenRed2) to P ′, we getQ′ ≡ P2 | Q2. By Theorem 4.4, we can derive that (Sˆ ′, Iˆ ′B, Iˆ ′E , Hˆ ′) |=B Q′,
and, by (1) and (2) above, we get that ns(Q, Sˆ) ≡ ns(Q′, Sˆ ′). By the deﬁnition of S , it follows that (Q,Q′) ∈ S .
Inductive step: By case analysis of the last operational rule applied among the ones in Fig. 2.
(ResRed) Let P = (n)P1, Q = (n)Q1, and P1 −→ Q1. Assume (P , P ′) ∈ S , i.e., ns(P , Sˆ) ≡ ns(P ′, Sˆ ′). In this
case, P ′ is of the form (n)P ′1 if n ∈ Sˆ , or of the form P ′1 if n ∈ Sˆ , with ns(P1, Sˆ) ≡ ns(P ′1 , Sˆ ′), then (P1, P ′1 ) ∈ S .
By induction hypothesis, ∃Q′1 s.t. P ′1 −→∗ Q′1 and (Q1,Q′1) ∈ S , i.e., ns(Q1, Sˆ) ≡ ns(Q′1, Sˆ ′). By applying rule
(ResRed), P ′ goes into Q′ = (n)Q′1, with ns(Q, Sˆ) ≡ ns(Q′, Sˆ ′) since ns(Q1, Sˆ) ≡ ns(Q′1, Sˆ ′). It follows that
(Q,Q′) ∈ S .
(AmbRed) Let P = n[P1 ] , Q = n[Q1] , and P1 −→ Q1. Assume (P , P ′) ∈ S , i.e., ns(P , Sˆ) ≡ ns(P ′, Sˆ ′). In this
case, n ∈ Sˆ since P is assumed to be protective. Then, P ′ is of the form P ′ ≡ n[P ′1] with n ∈ Sˆ ′ and ns(P1, Sˆ) ≡
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ns(P ′1 , Sˆ ′), and (P1, P
′
1 ) ∈ S . By induction hypothesis, ∃Q′1 s.t. P ′1 −→∗ Q′1 and (Q1 ,Q′1) ∈ S , i.e., ns(Q1, Sˆ) ≡
ns(Q′1, Sˆ ′). By applying rule (AmbRed), P ′ goes into Q′ = (n)Q′1, with ns(Q, Sˆ) ≡ ns(Q′, Sˆ ′) since ns(Q1, Sˆ) ≡
ns(Q′1, Sˆ ′). It follows that (Q,Q′) ∈ S .
Once proved that S is a barbed bisimulation, by Lemma 4.6 there exists a triplet (Sˆ , Iˆ ′′, Hˆ ∪ Hˆ ′) such
that (Sˆ , Iˆ ′′, Hˆ ∪ Hˆ ′) |=B C(P) and Protected(Sˆ , (Iˆ ′′, Hˆ ∪ Hˆ ′)). Then, it is easy to see that (SˆN , Iˆ ′′, HˆN ∪
Hˆ ′) |=B C(PN ) and Protected(SˆN , (Iˆ ′′, HˆN ∪ Hˆ ′)) and ns(C(P), SˆN ∪ Sˆ ′) = ns(C(PN ), SˆN ∪ Sˆ ′). There-
fore (C(P), C(PN )) ∈ S , i.e., they are barbed bisimilar (step 2 of the proof). This concludes the proof. 
Example 4.13. Let us compute the analysis over some of the examples described throughout the chapter. Recall
from Example 2.11 that the least analysis for process P4 returns Sˆ = {hdata}, IˆB = {(b1, h), (b1, b2), (h, c1), (b2, c2)},
IˆE = {(env, b1), (env, b2)}, and Hˆ = {(b1, container), (h, hdata), (b2, send)}. SinceProtected(h, (IˆE , Hˆ ))= true, P4
does not leak Sˆ .
Regarding P6 of Example 3.6, we have that the suspect set Sˆ computed by the analysis must contain send as
well,asitperformscapabilitiesoverhigh-levelambients(recallthat sendb2[[ inc1hdata.outc2hdata .outc3container]] ).
More precisely, the analysis result consists of Sˆ = {hdata, send}, IˆB = {(b1, b2), (b2, c1), (b2, c2),
(b2, c3), (b1, c4), }, IˆE = {(env, b1), (env, b2)}, and ﬁnally Hˆ = {(b1, container), (b2, send)}. In this case,
Protected(b2, (IˆE , Hˆ )) = false, thus process P6 cannot be proved interference-free, and indeed it is not since
send, a suspect ambient, may exit from container.
Notice that in [20] also deadlocks are shown to be potential sources of information leakage. In order to deal
with this special kind of information ﬂow, it is sufﬁcient to strengthDeﬁnition 3.8 by using an equivalence notion
which is deadlock-suspect, such as bisimilarity. Observe that Theorem 4.12 still holds even with this stronger
notion of information leakage.
5. Related work and conclusion
The main novelty of the approach presented in this paper is that we face the problem of detecting at the same
time both direct and indirect information leakage (non-interference) in the context of Mobile Ambients. In [4],
we described a tool that implements the analysis for direct information leakage detection in the core Mobile
Ambient calculus, and in [7] we proved that the complexity of this analysis keeps reasonable (polynomial both in
space and in time). We expect similar experimental results also in the case of the analysis of indirect information
leakage detection, as it can be seen as a more sophisticated algorithm on a richer language.
The most related contributions in the area mainly focused on either extending the ambient calculus thus
enhancing its expressive power, or on building suitable type systems or control ﬂow analyses to verify security
properties.
Among the type systems approaches, it is worth to mention [11], where the authors introduce a new type
system for tracking the behaviour of mobile computations. Using groups, the type system can impose to an
ambient behavioural constraints on the set of ambients it may cross and the set of ambients it may open. It has
the effect of statically preventing certain communications through a mandatory access control policy, and can
block accidental or malicious leakage of secrets. Dezani and Salvo [15] extend the work of Cardelli et al. just
mentioned, with a type system that also expresses security levels associated with ambients and provide further
control over ambient movement and opening.
Among the control ﬂow analysis approaches, a lot of effort has been done to enrich the abstract domains
in order to obtain more detailed analyses that could be used to verify different security properties. In [16], the
author proposes an analysis on a non-standard semantics of mobile ambients with ﬁrst order communications
in order to distinguish different recursive instances of threads, and to identify which threads can be launched in
which ambients and which ambient names can be communicated to which threads. In [30,28], an exponential
analysis for computing occurrences of threads inside ambients is described. In [25], the authors propose an
abstract interpretation framework for MA based on a normal semantics. Unfortunately, the more detailed are
the abstract domains of the analysis, the more complex is the analysis. In addition, the fact that a different
488 C.Braghin et al. / Information and Computation 206 (2008) 460–489
semantics is used, make it more difﬁcult to compare the approach with the type system ones. In any case, our
approach to address indirect information leakage can be easily integrated within all of these analyses.
In the context of language extensions, some valuable proposals are described in [8,9,10,14,26]. Safe Ambients
is a modiﬁcation of Mobile Ambients, where a movement or an ambient dissolution can take place only when
the affected ambient agrees, offering the corresponding coaction. Boxed Ambients [10] is another variant of the
Ambient calculus with a completely different model of communication, which results from dropping the open
capability. In their paper, Bugliesi et al. deﬁne also a type system that provides an effective mechanism for
resource protection and access control. In [24], Degano et al. present a control ﬂow analysis that mainly focuses
on access control. The analysis relies on the use of coactions as a ﬁlter to control access to resources.
As already said in the introduction, as far as we know the only work towards the study of non-interference
in the context of Mobile Ambients is [13], where a type system that guarantees that well-typed programs do not
interfere when in parallel with any high-level source is studied for BoxedAmbients. One of the priorities as future
work will be to carefully compare these two approaches. This may also give interesting insights on the trade-off
between accuracy and efﬁciency and usability between type system and control-ﬂow analysis techniques. Their
results indeed rely critically on the choice of contextual equivalence as the underlying equivalence relation, thus
do not extend to ﬁner equivalence relationships, such as barbed congruence.
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